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Kenneth L. Failor ("Mr. Failor"), Premium Plastics, Inc. ("PPI") and Mary Gilmer,
("Mrs. Gilmer") respectfuUy submit this Brief of the Appellants. Collectively, AppeUants are
sometimes referred to herein as "Premium Plaintiffs". The Appellee/Defendant is often
referred to as "MegaDyne".
INTRODUCTION
Justice OUver WendeU Holmes Jr. is reputed to have said. "Lawyer's spend a great
deal of their time shoveling smoke." In an attempt to clear the air in the case at bar, the
Plaintiffs Reply Brief focuses on undisputed dispositive facts gleaned from the parties briefs
and the basic codified rules of law. The undisputed facts and basic rules of law, clearly
demonstrate: (1) the Premium Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial; (2) the master's report is
faciaUy erroneous, and should not be used by the Court for any purpose; (3) no
"accounting" ever occurred; (4) because the master violated every Order of Reference
direction and procedural safeguard, his flawed report should not be used by the trial court;
and (5) it was abuse of discretion to deny the Mrs. Gilmer's and other Premium Plaintiffs'
motion to amend their complaint. For these compelling reasons, the Interlocutory Order on
the foregoing issues should be reversed.
R E S P O N S E T O S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS
The background of the parties' relationship, the agreements entered into between the
parties and the appointment of the special master in this case are generally not in dispute. In
its statement of facts, however, Megadyne glosses over the fact that this case is not simply
and only an accounting case. Rather, this is a breach of contract case involving various
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written agreements entered into between the parties. The Premium Plaintiffs respond to the
Appellee's Statement of Facts as follows:
1.

Paragraphs 1 through 4 are undisputed. This case stems from a series of

contracts between the parties. More importantly, it is undisputed that the Premium
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges the legal claims of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation.
The equitable claims of unjust enrichment and accounting are also in the complaint. (R. 1 43)
2.

Paragraph 5. MegaDyne acknowledges that the Premium Plaintiffs' claims are

all based on amounts not paid under the various agreements. But the Premium Plaintiffs
two misrepresentation claims are actually centered on MegaDyne's partial and incomplete
documentation, (R. 42, para 41) something that MegaDyne continued to do during this
entire litigation. See paragraph 41 of the statement of facts in Appellant's Opening Brief
3.

Paragraph 6. The fact that the Premium Plaintiffs' alternative accounting

claim was necessary to determine what amounts were owed under the various agreements
does not mean that the Premium Plaintiffs are not entitled to pursue their primary legal
claims through a jury trial as requested. Also, the complaint asked for the legal remedies of
compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as the equitable remedy of an
accounting. (R. 42-43)
4.

Paragraph 7. The order of the Premium Plaintiffs' request for relief in the

complaint has no bearing on any issue raised in this appeal.

2

5.

Paragraphs 8-11. It is correct that 5 months into the litigation the Premium

Plaintiffs moved for and the MegaDyne consented to, the appointment of a Special Master
to deal with the issue of products coated and sold. MegaDyne omits the portions of that
motion addressing the substantive basis for the Premium Plaintiffs' request. The Premium
Plaintiffs told the court, "Supporting documentation will need to be reviewed from . . .
suppliers and customers." (R. 73: 7-9) Something that was not done. (R. 1242 and para 29
of the Appellee's Statement of Facts identifying 22 categories of documents not used by the
master.) MegaDyne also omits the substance of the Order of Reference (R. 84-88) which is
summarized in paragraph 20 of the Appellants Opening Brief.
6.

Subheading's C and E are Argument and should be ignored.

7.

Paragraph 12. It is undisputed that 277 days after the Master accepted his

appointment and 155 days after the Master was supposed to have completed his work, the
Premium Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the Order of Reference (See R. 84-90 and 193195). N o t only is it undisputed that the Master did not comply with the Order of Reference
deadlines, it is also undisputed that he refused to provide a work plan or a status report
indicating when he would file his report which was due more than 6 months earlier. (See
Order of Reference and R: 171 para's 13-15 and R. 1235-1236). Those facts, the base of the
motion, were not (disputed in the Appellee's opposing memorandum. (See R. 206-210).
Lastly, it is misleading to simply say "The District Court rejected the Respondent's
Objections." Instead, the Court imposed a new set of deadlines and reserved on the issue of
the ex parte contacts. (See Vol 2 of District Court Order, unnumbered May 23, 2000, p. 2).
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8.

Paragraph 13. It is undisputed that the Premium Plaintiffs filed a Renewed

Motion to Vacate the Order of Reference, after more than a year lapsed beyond the Order
of Reference's deadline to file the Master's Report. Again, the factual grounds for the
motion were undisputed. The Master had not complied with the deadlines ordered by the
Court. (R. 343-345). Instead the Appellee mistakenly said that the May 23, 2000 order
extended discovery to May 23, 2000. (R. 355).1 It did not. It set the deadline of April 23,
2000. (see Vol. 2 of the District Court Record, Order of May 23, 2000 unnumbered).
MegaDyne then submitted to the Court a document entitled Stipulation, Motion and Order,
to which the Premium Plaintiffs did not sign or agree, extending the deadlines. (R. 328-331).
It is correct that the Renewed Motion to Vacate was denied 14 months later on July 17,
2001.
9.

Paragraphs 14 and 15 are disputed. Almost all of the Master's process was ex

parte with "key" MegaDyne personnel. (See paras 25-27 and 38 of the Premium Plaintiffs'
Opening Brief). Moreover, the MegaDyne's citation of a letter (R. 6508) for the notion that
the Master would conduct its examination on May 3, 1999, where no request to attend was
made, is misleading. In the unsworn letter, the Master says, the Ernst & Young notes and
collective recollections did not indicate a request to be in attendance. (R. 6508). However,
the record lacks any invitation to be there and the sworn affidavit of Ken Failor states:
"[A]t the April 21 s t meeting, no specific work plan was agreed
to. The Plaintiffs work plan was presented to the Master. The
Master did not indicate that he rejected it, but neither did he
comment to us whether he would follow it. What was
important, however, is that no one agreed that the Master
1

Megadyne's Memorandum opposing the Premium Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Vacate was mistakenly captioned
"Response to Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Stipulation, Motion and Order. (R. 420, 355).
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should go on his own to view MegaDyne's documents without
the presence of the Plaintiffs. In other words, n o one agreed
that he could conduct discovery different than that allowed for
in the order of reference. Instead, Mr. Curran explained that he
wanted to go out to MegaDyne to get the lay of the land before
doing any significant work."
(R. 263 paras 9-10).
10.

Paragraphs 16 through 17 are disputed. The undisputed sworn testimony of

Plaintiffs' expert, Derk Rasmussen, is that the documents examined by the Master do not
support the Master's report. (R. 4546-4547). And that it was impossible to determine the
number of products coated and sold from the partial documents supplied by MegaDyne and
reviewed by the Master. (Id) there were 32 categories of documents the Master should have
used, but did not. (R. 4558-4565). Lasdy, as set forth in detail in the Premium Plaintiffs'
opening brief, the special master's report was clearly erroneous. He failed, among other
things, to obtain and consider key documents, failed to consider all products and lots, failed
to perform adequate sampling and testing, improperly relied on product schedules or lists
provided to him by MegaDyne, and failed to explain the process by which he arrived at his
conclusions. (R. 4546, 4570-4588). Lastiy, he failed to reconcile his inventory hypothesis
with an impossible amount of sales.
11.

Paragraphs 18 through 28.

MegaDyne's implication that the Premium

Plaintiffs' objections to the special master's work were an improper "attack" is again a
mischaracterization of the proceedings. The Premium Plaintiffs objected to the special
master's work because the special master failed to comply with the Order of Reference and
his work and conclusions were facially incomplete, inaccurate, and internally inconsistent.
(See R. 2044-2062 and 4546-4634).
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12.

Paragraphs 29 through 35. The Premium Plaintiffs' allegation that

MegaDyne misappropriated trade secrets for use in litigation leading to a recovery for
MegaDyne is sufficient for the Premium Plaintiffs to assert a claim under the Utah Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("Act"). Misappropriation under the Act requires only that a party acquire
a trade secret knowing it was acquired by improper means or disclose a trade secret under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy. In the Amended Complaint, the
Premium Plaintiffs allege that MegaDyne improperly obtain the Premium Plaintiffs5 trade
secrets without the consent of the Premium Plaintiffs, knowing that MegaDyne was not
entided to obtain the trade secrets. It is further alleged that MegaDyne improperly utilized
those trade secrets to its benefit in the Aspen Labs litigation. The Premium Plaintiffs do not,
as asserted by MegaDyne, contend that they are entided to share in MegaDyne's recovery in
the Aspen Labs litigation. Rather, the Premium Plaintiffs properly request an award of
damages under the Act based on MegaDyne's misappropriation of their trade secrets. (See
Introduction of this Brief)
Plaintiffs removed their equitable claims for accounting and unjust enrichment when
they determined that the accounting claim was futile in light of MegaDyne's continued
refusal to provide comprehensive information to Plaintiffs. (See R. 4546-4549). Plaintiffs
could not have foreseen MegaDyne's obstructionist tactics before initiating this suit. (See
paragraph 4 of the Premium Plaintiffs' statement of Facts in their Opening Brief).
MegaDyne's repeated assertion that the evidentiary hearing ordered by the district
court judge never occurred is irrelevant. The district court granted MegaDyne's motion to
strike the jury demand, depriving the Premium Plaintiffs of their constitutional right to a jury
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trial on their legal claims. The denial of that right is the crux of this appeal. The court also
repeatedly denied the Appellants' objections that the Master did not abide by the procedural
requirements and deadlines of the Order of Reference.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PREMIUM PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL
ON THIER LEGAL CLAIMS A N D MEGADYNE CITES N O
CONTRARY AUTHORITY.

No Utah appellate court has ever denied a jury trial on legal claims when a master was
appointed and a jury trial demanded. That is not surprising. Article I, Section 10 of the
Utah Constitution and Rules 39 and 53(e)(3) explicitly guarantee that right. In contrast,
MegaDyne begins with a citation to Corpus Juris Secundum ("CJS"), a treatise of last resort
that is no longer widely used by legal practitioners and cannot be obtained from online
research sources such as LEXIS NEXIS or WESTLAW. CJS does not set forth the
applicable rules with respect to an accounting performed by a special master; the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Order of Reference do. As demonstrated below, MegaDyne's
citation to CJS relies on an incorrect special master procedure.
MegaDyne mistakenly says that an accounting conducted by a special master will
stand "if no exception" is taken to the master's report. (Emphasis added) P. 16. First, as set
forth in detail by die Premium Plaintiffs in their opening brief, and in the fact section of this
brief, the Premium Plaintiffs raised several procedural and substantive objections to the
special master's report precluding the Court from simply adopting the master's report as a
matter of course. More importantly, however, the procedure referred to by MegaDyne is a
procedure applicable only to non-jury actions under Rule 53(e)(2). It is not the procedure
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followed m actions where, as here, a jury trial was demanded

2

Under Rule 53(e)(2), 1 e non

jury trials, a court may accept the master's findings and adopt his report unless clearly
erroneous That standard and procedure, does not apply m a jury action where a special
master's "findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury

" Utah R Civ P 53(e)(2)

In a jury action,

the Court does not have the authorm to simply adopt the master's findings and report
Rather, the special master's findings are submitted to the jury like any other evidence

The

Premium Plaintiffs are not attempting to "wish away the Special Master's report and start
from scratch " Rather, the Premium Plaintiffs simply want any unobjectionable portions of
the report to be presented to the jury as evidence as provided by Rule 53(e)(3)
While the Premium Plaintiffs set forth exhaustive, applicable authority supporting
their position that they cannot be denied a jury trial simply because they requested an
accounting, MegaDyne responds by stating, without explanation or support, that the cases
cited by the Premium Plaintiffs are distinguishable from this case MegaDyne says, again
without support, that the case law relied ipon by the Premium Plaintiffs is inapplicable
because those cases did not involve a stipulation to an accounting that occurred before the
plaintiff pursued its legal claims in the case This is simply incorrect N o n e of the cases
cited by the Premium Plaintiffs stand for the proposition, as MegaDyne would have it, that if
a party stipulates early in a case to an accounting conducted by a special master, before
pursuing its legal claims, that the party waives its right to later pursue its legal claims or
waives its right to a jury trial Whether the parties have stipulated to an accounting or an

2

From the beginning the Premium Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial (See R 8)
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accounting is ordered by the court, the timing of the accounting has no bearing on plamuff s
right to assert both legal and equitable claims and to a jury \rial where one was demanded. 3
MegaDyne also twists and misreads the Premium P'aintiffs' statements made in their
motion requesting the appointment of a special master. 'I nere, the Premium Plaintiffs did
not stipulate, as MegaDyne implies, that they would acce; t without exception the special
master's report or that the Court could simply enter judgment based upon the master's
findings.

Rather, the Premium Plaintiffs were simply explaining at the outset of the case that

the appointment of a special master, in many cases, simplifies the issues in complex cases
which may make the determination of final verdict easier. Asking for a special master early
in the case certainly is not a clear waiver of a right to proceed with the Rule 53(e)(3) process
for use of a special master's findings and report in a jun case.
MegaDyne cites to one and only one case in arguing that the district court properly
struck the Premium Plaintiffs request for a jury demand. That case, Haynes Trane Service
Agency, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 51 Fed. Appx. 786 (10 th Cir. 2002), plainly supports the
Premium Plaintiffs' position. There, the plaintiff asserted legal claims, including breach of
contract, as weD as equitable claims for accounting and unjust enrichment. See id. at 799-800.
The court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed to trial on both its equitable and
legal claims and held that "the district court erred in finding that [plaintiff] waived its
counterclaims for unjust enrichment and an accounting" on the basis that the plaintiff had
also proceeded with its legal claims. See id. at 800. While the court did state that s o m e cases
are so complex that an accounting may be warranted, the court did not', as suggested by
3

Moreover, as shown in part III of this Argument, the Premium Plaintiffs never have and never will receive an
accounting.
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MegaDyne, state that pursuing an accounting claim waives the right to pursue legal remedies
or the right to a jury trial.
There is no dispute that an accounting in this case by a special master would have
been appropriate. That, however, has no bearing on the Premium Plaintiffs' right to pursue
their legal claims or their right to a jury trial.
11.

A L L ISSUES R A I S E D BY T H E P R E M I U M P L A I N T I F F S A R E
R I P E F O R REVIEW.

MegaDyne again relies on the inapplicable rule relating to non-jury actions in asserting
that the issue of the Premium Plaintiffs objections to the special master's report is not ripe
for review. Rule 53(e)(2) provides that a court must accept the findings of the special master
unless clearly erroneous "in an action to be tried without ajury"

Id. (emphasis added). Under

the applicable Rule 53(e)(3), the district court does not accept or reject the special master's
findings.

Rather, the special master's findings are submitted to the jury as evidence. Rule

53(e)(3) provides that:
In an action to be tried by a jury the master shall not be directed to
report the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are
admissible as evidence of the matters found and may be read to the
jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections in point of
law which may be made to the report.
Id. Because the objections to the master's report will ultimately be raised and decided at trial,
by a jury, the fact that the district court agreed to hold a hearing on the Premium Plaintiffs
objections to the master's report is of no moment. Furthermore, the district court
repeatedly ruled on most, if not all, of the objections made to the master's report by the
Premium Plaintiffs. As set forth in MegaDyne's statement of facts, the district court denied
the Premium Plaintiffs various procedural and substantive objections to the master's report
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and their request to vacate the master's report in orders dated May 23, 2000, (See Vol 2 of
the District Court record, unnumbered May 23, 2000 Order), July 19, 2001 (R. 1971), and
April 18, 2002. (R. 2433). In its order of May 6, 2008, the Court denied the Premium
Plaintiffs' procedural objections and expressed concern about the scope of any hearing on
the substantive objections. (R. 6703-6704, paras 2 and 4). Consequendy the time is ripe for
instructing the lower court on how objections to the report are to be made in a jury trial and
to reverse the orders denying the procedural objections.
MegaDyne incorrectly relies on State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). That case
has n o application here. In Herrera, the court, refused to consider the application of
legislation to an insanity defense where the defendants had not been convicted of any crime.
See id. at 371. In contrast, the district court's ruling in this case extinguished the Premium
Plaintiffs right to object to the master's findings at trial by striking their request for a jury
demand. The district court's denial of the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the master's
report and its denial of their right to a jury trial are inextricably intertwined. Whether
couched in terms of the district court's denial of the objections to the master's report or the
denial of the right to a jury trial, the district court's decision poses a controversy that is
properly before diis Court and ripe for decision.
Like the Herrera Court, the Utah Supreme Court, in Pett v. AutolivASP,

Inc., 2005 U T

5,106 P.3d 705, declined to decide an issue because there was no "imminent clash of legal
rights," only a mere "difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application" of law to
a particular situation. Id. \ 4. Here, however, the controversy is not hypothetical. Instead,
the district court's ruling has, with certainty, denied the Premium Plaintiffs of their right to a
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jury trial on their legal claims and, whether an additional hearing is held on the objections to
the master's report or not, has prohibited the Premium Plaintiffs from submitting their
objections to the master's findings under Rule 53(e)(3) Thus, an immediate question of
whether the Premium Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial exists, making all issues raised by
the Premium Plaintiffs ripe for review
111

1 H K D I S T R I C I L O U R 1 E R R E D IN REJECTING

IHE

5

P R E M I U M P L A I N T I F F S O B J E C T I O N S T O T H E MASTER'S
REPORT, N O ACCOUNTING OCCURRED, A N D T H E
MASTER'S R E P O R T WAS CLEARLY E R R O N E O U S .
A.

T h e District court Err< ti in I Icnying the O b j e c t i o n s to flu
Report.

Master's

MegaDyne cites to Plumb v State, 809 P 2d 734, 744 (Utah 1990), in support of its
argument that the district court properly rejected the Premium Plaintiffs procedural
objections to the Special Master's report

Plumb, however, demonstrates that the lower

court, m the case at bar, erred in refusing to require the special master to comply with the
specific procedural requirements and safeguards in the Order of Reference
appellants asserted that the special master exceeded the Order of Reference

In Plumb, the
Id. at 741

The

Utah Supreme Court stated:
The scope of the master's authority may be specific or limited by the order of
reference. If so, the order of reference is at once the chart and limitation of the master s
authority. A.nd the master should not exceed it even with the consent of the parties
Id. at 742 (emphasis added). The special master m Plumb investigated and reported on
attorneys' fees, an issue not included m the order of reference. The Plumb Court concluded
the trial court erred in adopting the special master's findings because they exceeded the
master's authority under the order or reference. See id.
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As explained in King v. Spain, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 667 N o . M2006-02178-COAR3-CV (October 31, 2007):
A [special master's] report is ordinarily either a formal statement by the Master
which finds certain facts, or a formal statement of how he has discharged
some duty imposed upon him by the Court. It is, therefore, essential to a
complete report that the Master shall fully and definitely respond to every
matter referred, to the end that the report may supply the Court with all the
facts called for or inquired about. In all respects it should show that the Master has
fully andproperly discharged every duty imposed on him by the order ojreference.
An ideal report should not only contain everything called for, and how every
duty imposed has been performed, but // should contain no recital of facts not called
for, and no statement of acts not required to be done. In making his report the Master
must confine himself to the matter referred to him. Those matters
circumscribe his authority and limit his jurisdiction. All other matters
contained in his report are mere surplusage and impertinence.
The report must not only respond to all the requirements of the order of reference,
but it must be positive, definite, and correct; not inferential, hypothetical, or in the
alternative as to any matter . . . .
Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
MegaDyne's assertion that the special master did not exceed his authority under the
Order of Reference is similarly without merit. MegaDyne cites no authority for the
proposition that a special master may include in his report information beyond that set forth
in the Order of Reference. T o the contrary, the case law cited and relied by the Premium
Plaintiffs in their opening brief and above clearly establishes that a special master is strictly
limited by the Order of Reference. As such the Special Master had no right whatsoever to
determine an amount owed between the parties.
The special master also did not abide the Order of Reference procedures, i.e. the
"chart." H e did not obtain and review critical documents. He did not conduct a complete
investigation. He did not take advantage of discovery procedures available to him. The
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foregoing resulted in a report that did not accomplish the Order of Reference directive, the
preparation of a complete and accurate report on the number of products coated and
number sold {See R 4546-4634)
Next, MegaDyne's reliance on Normandeau v Hanson Equip, Inc, 2007 U T A p p 382, in
asserting that an abuse of discretion standard applies to compliance with scheduling orders,
is misplaced This case does not involve an attorney's planning report and concomitant
scheduling order as did Normandeau Rather, discovery m this case was governed by the
Order of Reference which is the chart and limit of the Master's authority

It is undisputed

that the special master discarded the discovery process and ignored the deadlines in the
Order of Reference
MegaDyne curiously asserts that the Premium Plaintiffs have not meaningfully
challenged the Special Master's work or conclusions Appellee's Brief at 24 While
MegaDyne characterizes the work of the Premium Plaintiffs' experts as "pot shots," the
reality is that the Premium Plaintiffs' expert, a national forensic accounting firm, carefully
reviewed all of the relevant documents and information and prepared 2 affidavits and a
comprehensive and detailed report with supporting schedules showing the deficiencies in the
master's report

(R 2186-2216 and 4546-4634) The trial court agreed that the Premium

Plaintiffs had raised serious issues with respect to the master's report in granting the
Premium Plaintiffs an evidentiary hearing on their objections to the master's report
(R 6963, para 4)
With no substantive basis to challenge the Premium Plaintiffs' objections to the
master's report, MegaDyne asserts that the Premium Plaintiffs' expert report, which can be
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based on inadmissible documents under the rules of evidence, is not reliable because the
underlying documents are not authenticated and contain hearsay. Any evidentiary
objections, however, can be easily dealt with at trial where the Premium Plaintiffs can
present all evidence refuting the special master's report and MegaDyne can cross-examine
that evidence. MegaDyne's evidentiary objections to the documentation and testimony
submitted by the Premium Plaintiffs in objecting to the special master's report only
underscores the need for a trial where all evidence can be presented to and considered by a
jury.
B.

N o Accounting H a s Occurred And Can N e v e r Occur If T h e Process
Is Limited T o Only T h e D o c u m e n t s Supplied By Megadyne.

Typically, in royalty cases where the defendant has control over the records that can
establish a plaintiffs damages, the risk of any incompleteness in the records is shifted to the
defendant by requiring him to prove that royalties are not owed, a n d / o r a Court resolves all
inconsistencies in the records in favor of the plaintiff. See Wolf v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 130 Cal Rptr.2d 860 (Cal. App. 2003); Palma v. Fox, 93 F.Supp. 134, 135 (S.D.NY.
1947); See generally, Cheves v. Williams, 1999 U T 86, \ 13, 993 P.2d 191 (burden of proof
regarding whether partnership funds were used to acquire assets . . . shifts to the
defendants). The assumption is that the defendant has or should have all the documents
necessary to make the calculation. But in this case, an accounting is impossible, because it is
undisputed that MegeDyne's documents are hopelessly incomplete. Consequendy, relying
on documents "voluntarily supplied" by MegaDyne (See Appellee's brief, p. 22) does not and
cannot do the job.
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When the Premium Plaintiffs' forensic accountant examined the documents made
available to the Master, he testified by affidavit, "it is impossible to determine the number of
products coated and the number sold from the foregoing documents" [made available to the
Master]. (R. 4559, para 6). He determined that there were 32 categories of documents that
had not been produced by MegaDyne that were necessary to determine the number of
products coated and the number sold. (R. 4548, para 2).
More importantly, MegaDyne manufactures medical products. Consequentiy it must
compile FDA packets of documents so that its products can be traced and the quantity of
units processed can be known. But MegaDyne's FDA packets are incomplete and deficient.
Consequendy, the amount of products coated and sold cannot be determined. (R. 45484549 and 4594). Coming to a damage figure is not simple arithmetic, as MegaDyne naively
asserts. It is impossible based only on the documents MegaDyne made available to the
Master.
When third party documents are used, however, a Plaintiff award of over $2 million is
supportable. (R. 5347-5351).
C.

T h e Master's Report is Facially Erroneous.

Even if the "clearly erroneous standard" in Rule 53(d)(2) applied to the case at bar,
and it does not because this is a jury case under Rule 53(d)(3), the Master's report is facially
and clearly erroneous. T o know the amount of products coated and sold during a particular
period of time, the fixing of the beginning inventory amount must be reliable. In this case it
is undisputed that the Master simply backed into the beginning inventory number by
calculating the ending inventory of September 30, 1997, adding his calculation of sold
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products, and subtracting his calculation of units purchased. By doing that he assumed a
beginning inventory of 1,219,167 units in March, 1996. But for his calculations to be
correct, MegaDyne would have had to have sold 4,118,912 pieces during March to
December, 1996. The Special Master, however, reported sales of only 3,225,147. (R. 4575).
III.

A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING T H E
PREMIUM PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO AMEND T H E
COMPLAINT.
The Premium Plaintiffs Properly Pleaded a Claim for
Violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

MegaDyne says the Premium Plaintiffs did not properly plead a claim for violation of
the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act in their proposed amended complaint. MegaDyne
argues that the claim is deficient because the amended complaint does not use the words
"misappropriated" or "improper means." It is axiomatic, however, that under Utah's liberal
pleading standards, the use of specific words is not required in order to plead a claim for
relief. Rather, all that is required is a "short and plain statement. . . showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief. The plaintiff must only give the
defendant fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved." Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60 Tl 13 (citing Utah R.
Civ. P. 8(a)).
In the proposed amended complaint (R. 6530-6545), the Premium Plaintiffs allege the
following:
27.

On information and belief, MegaDyne has successfully prosecuted patent
litigation, including but not limited to the following: MegaDyne v. Aaron Med.
Industries, case no: 2:96CV0233 UC (1998); MegaDyne v. American Catheter, case
no: 2:97XC0166 DAK (1998); MegaDyne v. DeRoyal Industries et al, case no:
2:00CV00267 TC (1999); MegaDyne v. Olsen Electrical Medical, case no:
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2:91CV00019 BST (1993); MegaDyne v. Sawn, case no: 2:97CV00228 TC
(1997); MegaDyne v. Triad Medical Tech et a/, case no: 2:00CV00548-18 (2003);
MegaDyne v. UmMed Medical Products, case no: 2:01CV0021 D A K (2001); and
MegaDyne Medical Products Inc. v. Aspen Tabs lncy case no: 2:91CV00852 VSJ
(\99\)(^Aspen Tabs litigation').
28.

Mr. Failor and Mr. Gilmer provided supporting testimony and disclosed their
trade secrets in the Aspen Tabs litigation to enable MegaDyne to prevail. On
information and belief, recentiy discovered by the Premium Plaintiffs, the
information provided by Mr. Gilmer and Mr. Failor in the Aspen Tabs litigation,
was used by MegaDyne to prevail in the other cases specific above.

29.

As a result, MegaDyne received compensation from some or all the
defendants named above based on a formula of a fixed amount per coated
unit manufactured or sold by the foregoing defendants a n d / o r gross sales, or
other as yet undisclosed formulas.

30.

Throughout the course of their dealing with MegaDyne, the Plaintiffs and
MegaDyne have been bound by confidentiality agreements and duties of good
faith and fair dealing. However, as a result of the Aspen Tabs litigation, the
Premium Plaintiffs were induced to disclose trade secrets that were not
obligated under contract, but were used to the monetary benefit of
MegaDyne's and for which the Premium Plaintiffs received no compensation.

E I G H T H CLAIM F O R R E L I E F
(Violation of the Uniform Trade Secret Act, Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-5 et seq)
93.

Premium Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege all other allegations
of the Complaint as set forth in the preceding paragraphs.

94.

In the course of Premium Plaintiffs dealing with MegaDyne, the Premium
Plaintiffs developed and maintained trade secrets on behalf of MegaDyne.
Those trade secrets included improvements on the processes described in the
Blanch patents, resulting in significantly more effective and safe products as
well as increased efficiencies in production.

95.

Although the contracts between MegaDyne and the Premium Plaintiffs
contemplated the possibility of Mr. Gilmer's eventually conveying trade
secrets he developed to MegaDyne. The contracts precedent that would have
required Mr. Gilmer to convey his trade secrets never materialized. This
interpretation of the Contract obligations was made by the Executive V P of
MegaDyne, Matthias Sansom, during the Aspen Tabs litigation in June of 1993,
and the conditions precedent terms were not, in fact met during the three year
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term specified by the Contract Thus the Premium Plaintiffs were never
obligated to purvey their trade secrets to MegaDyne
96

Nevertheless, MegaDyne obtained the trade secrets from the Premium
Plaintiffs and on information and belief used them in the Aspen Labs litigation
and other subsequent patent infringement cases relying on Aspen Labs for
precedent The value of those trade secrets was acknowledged by the
Premium Plaintiffs and MegaDyne in the course of the Aspen Labs litigation
and subsequent proceedings

97

Although MegaDyne relied heavily on the Premium Plaintiffs trade secrets m
its successful prosecution of its claims m Aspen Labs and in subsequent cases
relying on Aspen Labs as a precedent, the Premium Plaintiffs received n o
consideration for that convenience

Although the Premium Plaintiffs did not use the words "misappropriate" or
"improper means" in the proposed amended complaint, the proposed amended complaint
clearly sets forth the claim under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act It is alleged that
MegaDyne was not entitled to obtain the trade secrets from the Premium Plaintiffs, but that
the Premium Plaintiffs were induced to disclose those secrets which MegaDyne then used,
without authorization, to its benefit in litigation resulting in monetary gain for MegaDyne
The allegations meet the notice pleading standard under Rule 8 and MegaDyne's assertion
that the proposed amended complaint would be futile is without merit
B.

T h e Premium Plaintiffs' Proposed A m e n d e d
Complaint Was Timely.

MegaDyne incorrectly asserts that the Premium Plaintiffs have provided no
justification for moving to amend their complaint nine years after the litigation began

Leave

to amend a complaint should be "freely given when justice so requires " Mountain Am Credit
Union v McClellan, 854 P 2d 590, 592 (Utah Ct A p p 1993) (citing Utah R Civ P 15) Three
factors are relevant in considering a motion for leave to amend (1) timeliness of the motion,
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(2) reason for the delay; and (3) prejudice to the responding party. Id. In analyzing the
timeliness prong, Utah courts typically will deny the amendment only when the delay results
from "bad faith effort during the pleading process or unreasonable neglect in terms of
pleading preparation." Kelly v. HarJ Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 745 (Utah Ct. App.
2004). In addition to the factors set forth above, the motion to amend analysis is "a multifactored, flexible inquiry that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual
circumstances and legal developments involved in each particular case." Kelly, 87 P.3d at
746. Discovery of new information or evidence justifies amendment of a complaint. Kelly,
87 P.3d at 743. ("In considering the justification prong of the analysis, Utah courts have
typically focused on whether the moving party had knowledge of the events that are sought
to be added in the amended complaint before the original complaint was filed"). "Motions
to amend are typically deemed untimely when they are filed in the advanced procedural
stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of discovery, on the eve of a
scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been entered." Kelly v. Hard
Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d at, 742..
The Premium Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint on December 5, 2007, the
deadline for amendment of pleadings agreed to by the parties. (R.6680-6687). The request
to amend was filed before fact discovery cut-off and before a trial date was set. Although
the case had been pending for several years before the Premium Plaintiffs move to amend
the complaint, the time the case has been pending, alone, does not justify the denial of the
request to amend the complaint.
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Furthermoi e, MegaDyne has consistently frustratec Plaintiffs5 discovery efforts, as
evidenced by the fact that the discovery is still ongoing N e w allegations, such as those
relating to the patent litigation, arise from information not known prior to the initiation of
this suit Specifically, the trade secrets claim is based in parr upon other litigation involving
MegaDyne (the "Aspen Labs Litigation' 7 )

(R 6680 6681) (See Plaintiffs' Motion to

Supplement the Record and attached submissions)

Plainuf "s learned of that litigation

during the course of discovery in this case MegaDyne, hov ever, refused to produce
relevant information regarding the Aspen Labs Litigation, forcing the Premium Plaintiffs to
petition the Aspen Labs court to release documents filed under seal in that case The Aspen
Labs court granted the Premium Plaintiffs request for release of those documents on August
10, 2007 A four month delay from the date of that order 13 the date of the Motion to
amend is more than reasonable given that, since the date of that order, Plaintiffs have had to
actually obtain and review the documents to insure the viability of the trade secrets claim
CONCLUSION
The Premium Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on heir legal claims At most the
Master's report is evidence to be submitted to the jury under Rule 53(d)(3) However, given
the Master's wholesale violation of the Order of Reference, and the facial impossibility of
correctness, the report should not be used for any purpose

T o deny the Premium Plaintiffs'

Motion to Amend rewards MegaDyne's stonewalling For these important reasons, the
Interlocutory Order on the foregoing issues should be reversed and the case remanded for a
jury trial
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